Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Nonnuclear weapons are increasingly able to threaten dual-use command, control, communication, and intelligence assets that are spaced based or distant from probable theaters of conflict.
U.S. and South Korean engagement with North Korea has focused almost exclusively on denuclearization to the detriment of progress in other areas that could advance normalization and reconciliation, which in turn could facilitate denuclearization.
At the moment, there’s probably no option for this administration to get U.S.-Iran policy right. But Trump could get it dangerously wrong if the policy drift and vacuum he’s created leads to an aggressive campaign to topple the Iranian regime or to military conflict.
While new manufacturing technology could increase the efficiency and visibility of nuclear supply-chain operations, the steady trend toward digitization and interconnection could result in unacceptable cyber risks, ranging from the loss of sensitive proprietary information to the spread of compromised components throughout nuclear infrastructure.
Paul Haenle sat down with Ambassador Chris Hill to analyze the objectives of the United States, North Korea, China, South Korea, and other regional players heading into the Singapore summit, providing insights into the potential successes and pitfalls of the meeting.
Detecting proliferation-relevant illicit financing is even harder than detecting money laundering or terrorism financing.
Washington underestimates the strength of attachment in Paris and Berlin to the current Iran deal, as well as the depth of differences between Europe and the United States on how to stabilize the Middle East.
What Trump might decide on the Iran Deal and what happens after.
North Korea openly seeks nuclear-armed ICBMs capable of threatening the United States. Its precise military requirements for such a weapon are, however, unknown.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s faulty assumptions and unrealistic expectations could doom prospects for peacefully deescalating one nuclear standoff—and applying these misguided lessons to Iran could manufacture yet another.
