Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
North Korea has a history of promising big and then working in secret to advance its program. Since the Trump administration has deliberately degraded the U.S. diplomatic capacity and nonproliferation expertise, Pyongyang would enjoy an advantage in the period following a summit.
As North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and ballistic missile capabilities mature, Washington should pursue a comprehensive and verified capping of Pyongyang’s nuclear program, pending total denuclearization at a later date.
John Bolton wants regime change in North Korea and Iran, and he’ll do whatever it takes to get it.
If one had to choose the most exceptional year in the history of the IAEA safeguards regime, it would be 2003. That year saw four events which, after 15 years, point to important lessons for the nonproliferation community, particular for the governments seeking to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
How well do the existing theories about nuclear proliferation predict North Korea’s successful nuclearization?
It would be a mistake to assume that China’s future nuclear power development will continue on the same trajectory as during the last twenty years.
America’s record of nuclear accords with the former Soviet Union remains a remarkable example of the ways that the world can address formerly intractable issues, step by step.
Before the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded in 2017, the G20 countries’ reactions to the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty were based on their own interests and loyalties.
In the 55 years since unseen nuclear bullets were dodged in the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States’ technical capabilities to gather intelligence have improved breathtakingly. Still, it is extremely difficult to know how foreign adversaries perceive their situation and calculate their moves.
Unlike during the Cold War, critical decision-making in the Nuclear Suppliers Group today is beset by its members' geo-strategic politics today for very specific reasons.
