Despite the positive nature of the joint statement by the Korean leaders pledging to make progress on long-standing problems, the reality is that there is much hard work to do if the U.S.-North Korean summit is to be a success and lead to real progress.
French President Emmanuel Macron sees his visit to Washington, DC as a chance for U.S. President Donald Trump to address some of his concerns with the existing Iran nuclear deal while still saving the deal itself.
The positive short-term outlook for a summit between Kim Jong Un, and President Donald Trump should not obscure the serious long-terms risks created by the latest spate of high-stakes diplomacy.
The circumstances of the meeting between Kim and Pompeo are far less significant than its consequences. Despite the odd timing and public exposure, the Trump administration has used a proven channel to attempt an extraordinary mission.
It is uncertain at best whether a Trump–Kim meeting will actually take place. If one does, the central issue will be the huge discrepancy between what the United States and the North Koreans mean by the phrase “committed to denuclearization.”
North Korea has a history of promising big and then working in secret to advance its program. Since the Trump administration has deliberately degraded the U.S. diplomatic capacity and nonproliferation expertise, Pyongyang would enjoy an advantage in the period following a summit.
As North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and ballistic missile capabilities mature, Washington should pursue a comprehensive and verified capping of Pyongyang’s nuclear program, pending total denuclearization at a later date.
John Bolton wants regime change in North Korea and Iran, and he’ll do whatever it takes to get it.
If one had to choose the most exceptional year in the history of the IAEA safeguards regime, it would be 2003. That year saw four events which, after 15 years, point to important lessons for the nonproliferation community, particular for the governments seeking to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
How well do the existing theories about nuclear proliferation predict North Korea’s successful nuclearization?