John Bolton wants regime change in North Korea and Iran, and he’ll do whatever it takes to get it.
If one had to choose the most exceptional year in the history of the IAEA safeguards regime, it would be 2003. That year saw four events which, after 15 years, point to important lessons for the nonproliferation community, particular for the governments seeking to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
How well do the existing theories about nuclear proliferation predict North Korea’s successful nuclearization?
It would be a mistake to assume that China’s future nuclear power development will continue on the same trajectory as during the last twenty years.
Over the next decade, the spread and maturation of additive manufacturing could challenge major control mechanisms for inhibiting nuclear proliferation.
America’s record of nuclear accords with the former Soviet Union remains a remarkable example of the ways that the world can address formerly intractable issues, step by step.
In this article, Tristan Volpe reviews Rachel Whitlark’s article, “Nuclear Beliefs: A Leader-Focused Theory of Counter-Proliferation.”
Before the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded in 2017, the G20 countries’ reactions to the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty were based on their own interests and loyalties.
In the 55 years since unseen nuclear bullets were dodged in the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States’ technical capabilities to gather intelligence have improved breathtakingly. Still, it is extremely difficult to know how foreign adversaries perceive their situation and calculate their moves.
Unlike during the Cold War, critical decision-making in the Nuclear Suppliers Group today is beset by its members' geo-strategic politics today for very specific reasons.