Australia’s discussion about its submarines should remind anyone who has forgotten it that nuclear fission reactors fueled with uranium are “strategic” technology, and that a changing geostrategic environment will put time-honored non-proliferation policies under pressure.
A second draft of the Nuclear Ban Treaty retains many problems associated with the first and raises new, serious questions.
Nuclear weapons will not solve Europe’s current security woes, but Washington should not dismiss German nuclear yearnings, as they reflect a growing sense of uncertainty in Berlin.
Thomas Wood, Robert Otto, and Tristan Volpe will discuss their recent articles in The Nonproliferation Review on positive inducements for nuclear proliferation, safety, and security.
Opponents and skeptics fear that the dynamics surrounding a nuclear ban treaty will distract attention and effort from the nonproliferation regime that has helped prevent nuclear war since 1945, and that has prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons to more states and to terrorist organizations.
A nuclear accident at North Korea’s Yongbyon Facility could leave Japan vulnerable to airborne radioactive fallout, requiring Japan to cooperate with North Korea and other nations to manage disaster.
The Trump administration should use its leverage to address Japan’s growing piles of unused plutonium.
When countries employ the threat of proliferation as a bargaining chip, there is a sweet spot between having too little and too much nuclear latency to extract concessions from Washington.
The dangers of nuclear proliferation and the policy responses to it should be assessed differently if nuclear weapons do not significantly augment a possessor’s coercive power.
Where North Korea is concerned, neither China nor the United States will achieve security acting separately.