For its own security and global stability, China should play a positive leadership role and adhere to a cool-headed, prudent, and well-thought-out nuclear policy.
President-Elect Donald Trump appears to have drawn a red line against North Korea’s acquiring the capability to threaten the United States with a nuclear-armed ballistic missile. Can he enforce it?
The question of the resilience of arms control and disarmament institutions to different political or other pressures rests mainly on their continued ability to function effectively.
Some of Germany’s prominent voices are musing about the options of a German or non-NATO European nuclear deterrent should a Trump administration roll back U.S. commitments to the alliance.
Critical differences between Chinese and U.S. thinking about nuclear weapons and deterrence result not merely from differing security environments and levels of military strength; they also exist because China and the United States have developed their own nuclear philosophies in implementing their security policies over many years.
What is the current relationship between disarmament and strategic stability? How might arms control and disarmament change in the twenty-first century? What relevance does the security environment have in current and future arms control initiatives?
One year has passed since Iran and the P5+1 group reached an agreement on Tehran’s nuclear program known as the JCPOA, an agreement which put an end to more than a decade of tension over Iran’s nuclear program and turned into an important model for peaceful resolution of a difference.
An advanced missile defense system, commonly called THAAD, is heading to South Korea, to counter threats from the DPRK. Neighboring China opposes the system.
For India, challenges remain six years after a road map for NSG membership initially emerged.
Incremental practical steps and confidence-building measures offer the best hope for progress toward the creation of a weapons of mass destruction–free zone in the Middle East.