The goal of denuclearizing North Korea is not dead, but the United States and its partners must accept that it will take time to realize this goal and that, in the meantime, there are real dangers that must be prevented from unfolding.
A second draft of the Nuclear Ban Treaty retains many problems associated with the first and raises new, serious questions.
The nuclear facility non-attack agreement between India and Pakistan is the most enduring nuclear confidence-building measure on record in South Asia, but it has lost practical utility and should be updated for contemporary circumstances.
The United States and Europe should consider bringing their current divergent positions on Iran closer into line.
Authoritative and non-authoritative Chinese commentaries on the Trump administration’s foreign policy have tended to avoid making hostile remarks in response to some notable U.S. provocations.
A nuclear accident at North Korea’s Yongbyon Facility could leave Japan vulnerable to airborne radioactive fallout, requiring Japan to cooperate with North Korea and other nations to manage disaster.
The United States, South Korea, China, and Japan must work together to offer a combination of security and economic incentives to make denuclearization a reasonable alternative for North Korea’s Kim Jong Un.
Increased risk-taking concerning North Korea’s nuclear ambitions could potentially pay off, but there’s a catch.
What are the realistic implications of North Korea's nuclear capability?
North Korea’s steady development of nuclear forces raises questions about why Pyongyang used its nuclear program to pursue coercive diplomacy in the past, and when the regime was in the strongest position to leverage this nuclear latency as an instrument of compellence against the United States.