Territorial conflicts in Southeastern Europe have hampered the implementation of international agreements on arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in disputed territories under the effective control of de facto regimes.
President Trump’s only realistic option for stopping North Korea’s nuclear march is reinvigorated diplomacy, followed by significantly ratcheting up the pressure if it fails.
The incoming Trump administration doesn’t seem to be in thrall of the do-something mentality. But this might change when dealing with the realities of governance.
The United States should pledge not to employ nuclear weapons except to defend itself, its allies or its partners from threats to their very existence.
The question of the resilience of arms control and disarmament institutions to different political or other pressures rests mainly on their continued ability to function effectively.
Some of Germany’s prominent voices are musing about the options of a German or non-NATO European nuclear deterrent should a Trump administration roll back U.S. commitments to the alliance.
Indian defense minister's intuitive doubt about no-first-use is understandable, but tweet-length musings are no substitute for rigorous analysis of consequences.
With India and Pakistan close to the brink of confrontation, the subcontinent presents an illuminating study in what happens when traditional assumptions about deterrence no longer hold.
What is the current relationship between disarmament and strategic stability? How might arms control and disarmament change in the twenty-first century? What relevance does the security environment have in current and future arms control initiatives?
A comprehensive assessment of the violent and non-violent options available to India to deter and respond to cross-border terrorism from Pakistan.