President Trump’s “grand bargain” with Putin is setting expectations too high for what can be achieved under the current circumstances.
What can be learned about China’s hypersonic boost-glide weapon program from flight tests, and the implications of the program for the security of the United States and our allies.
South Korea’s ongoing political crisis is making it difficult to respond effectively to North Korean provocations.
Territorial conflicts in Southeastern Europe have hampered the implementation of international agreements on arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in disputed territories under the effective control of de facto regimes.
President Trump’s only realistic option for stopping North Korea’s nuclear march is reinvigorated diplomacy, followed by significantly ratcheting up the pressure if it fails.
The incoming Trump administration doesn’t seem to be in thrall of the do-something mentality. But this might change when dealing with the realities of governance.
The United States should pledge not to employ nuclear weapons except to defend itself, its allies or its partners from threats to their very existence.
The concept of ‘virtual nuclear abolition’ appeals to the same realist self-help arguments that are normally invoked to explain why nuclear disarmament is neither feasible nor desirable.
The question of the resilience of arms control and disarmament institutions to different political or other pressures rests mainly on their continued ability to function effectively.
Some of Germany’s prominent voices are musing about the options of a German or non-NATO European nuclear deterrent should a Trump administration roll back U.S. commitments to the alliance.