The United States should pledge not to employ nuclear weapons except to defend itself, its allies or its partners from threats to their very existence.
The concept of ‘virtual nuclear abolition’ appeals to the same realist self-help arguments that are normally invoked to explain why nuclear disarmament is neither feasible nor desirable.
The question of the resilience of arms control and disarmament institutions to different political or other pressures rests mainly on their continued ability to function effectively.
Some of Germany’s prominent voices are musing about the options of a German or non-NATO European nuclear deterrent should a Trump administration roll back U.S. commitments to the alliance.
Indian defense minister's intuitive doubt about no-first-use is understandable, but tweet-length musings are no substitute for rigorous analysis of consequences.
With India and Pakistan close to the brink of confrontation, the subcontinent presents an illuminating study in what happens when traditional assumptions about deterrence no longer hold.
What is the current relationship between disarmament and strategic stability? How might arms control and disarmament change in the twenty-first century? What relevance does the security environment have in current and future arms control initiatives?
A comprehensive assessment of the violent and non-violent options available to India to deter and respond to cross-border terrorism from Pakistan.
An advanced missile defense system, commonly called THAAD, is heading to South Korea, to counter threats from the DPRK. Neighboring China opposes the system.
China has a choice to make to ensure that its sea-based nuclear capability can be a helpful addition to its existing nuclear deterrent without destabilizing regional security.