Kim Jong Un is likely to view President Trump much like his predecessors—as a president who doesn’t like North Korea’s nuclear capabilities but with few realistic options for stopping it.
Christopher Ford, special assistant to the president and NSC senior director for WMD and counterproliferation, delivered remarks regarding the U.S. position on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
North Korea’s motivations for pursuing nuclear capabilities have changed over time, but are rooted in a sense of existential threats coming from outside the regime.
The North Korean nuclear crisis is far from over, and foreclosing escalation pathways is in the best interests of the United States, its allies, and Pyongyang.
Tensions continue to mount between the U.S. and North Korea, prompting questions on the deterrence relationship and the reliability of North Korea's nuclear capabilities.
Uncertainty swirls around the U.S.-Russia nuclear relationship in light of new questions concerning Russian nuclear force advancement and the U.S. response.
As North Korea makes steady progress in its nuclear program, the United States must continue to strive for stability in the Korean peninsula.
Adding to pressure from loss of know-how and high costs, U.S. nuclear power plant vendors are now challenged by Chinese and Russian exporters whose government owners view nuclear energy in strategic, not commercial terms.
Despite recent setbacks to its nuclear program, Brazil remains a significant player in global nuclear matters. Argentina and the United States are the two countries that most closely follow Brazil’s nuclear policy and whose opinions matter most to Brazil.
Previous debates focusing on freezing North Korea's nuclear program are played out. Today, the main challenge is preventing North Korea from hurting the United States and its allies now that the Kim regime has long-range nuclear missiles.