If states truly want to help eliminate nuclear weapons, there are a few meaningful steps they can take to address urgent threats to the cause of global disarmament.
Even though arms control cannot prevent deliberate escalation, at least confidence-and-security-building measures could diminish the risk of unintended escalation. But the political realities in Moscow and Washington are not promising for conventional arms control in Europe.
To reduce danger, we need less bombast and better communication.
Pressure by the United States was less decisive in forcing South Korea to ratify the NPT in 1975 than commonly assumed.
Amid escalating tensions, South Koreans have begun voicing their concerns about a nuclear-armed North Korea-and debating bringing U.S. tactical nuclear weapons back to the Korean peninsula.
For a new nuclear state like North Korea, questions concerning strategic implementation abound.
Deterring North Korea is less risky than a preventative war.
North Korea’s nuclear arsenal exists to stop other countries’ quest for regime change in Pyongyang.
The risks of a military conflict with North Korea is growing day by day. Not talking has not slowed North Korea’s advance, and sanctions alone will not achieve the desired result.
Responsible nuclear states should work with the global nuclear industry to sustain strong nonproliferation, safety, and security practices in a market increasingly dominated by Russia and China.