The world is vastly different from when the nuclear order was built: proliferation risks and interest in nuclear energy are much lower, but regional insecurities raise danger of escalatory warfare. Meanwhile, the have/have not inequities impair cooperation to restore the foundation of order.
Unlike during the Cold War, critical decision-making in the Nuclear Suppliers Group today is beset by its members' geo-strategic politics today for very specific reasons.
Tensions with North Korea have grown under the administration of President Donald Trump, and the danger of nuclear confrontation is now higher than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis.
On the North Korea nuclear threat, global leaders have an obligation not to avoid reality.
Sanctions are seen as an essential tool for nonproliferation and in some cases prove useful, as with Iran. However, as new challenges such as North Korea loom, are the United States and its partners using sanctions the right way to achieve their objectives?
On August 21, U.S. President Donald Trump unveiled his new strategy toward South Asia, highlighting the administration’s concerns regarding the threat of terrorism in the region.
With North Korea’s testing of what appears to be a more advanced intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), China is under great pressure to impose crippling economic sanctions against Pyongyang, including cutting off its oil supply.
The risk of a nuclear war is rising because of growing non-nuclear threats to nuclear weapons and their command-and-control systems.
As the Trump administration develops its Nuclear Posture Review, the temptation of small nuclear weapons is back.
India and Pakistan’s behavior after both countries acquired nuclear weapons provides some context for North Korea's nuclear strategy and rationale.