In a conflict between Russia and NATO in the Baltic, the risks of escalation leading to nuclear use—deliberately, inadvertently, or accidentally—would be dangerously high. NATO must enhance deterrence against Russia while simultaneously pursuing resilience and risk-reduction measures.
As North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and ballistic missile capabilities mature, Washington should pursue a comprehensive and verified capping of Pyongyang’s nuclear program, pending total denuclearization at a later date.
John Bolton wants regime change in North Korea and Iran, and he’ll do whatever it takes to get it.
If one had to choose the most exceptional year in the history of the IAEA safeguards regime, it would be 2003. That year saw four events which, after 15 years, point to important lessons for the nonproliferation community, particular for the governments seeking to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
How well do the existing theories about nuclear proliferation predict North Korea’s successful nuclearization?
It would be a mistake to assume that China’s future nuclear power development will continue on the same trajectory as during the last twenty years.
Seoul wants to try diplomacy with Pyongyang. Where does that leave Washington?
Rather than use Cold War principles, nuclear states should shift their nuclear doctrines and capabilities to strategic deterrence as needed by the twenty-first century.
Nowhere are nuclear dangers growing more rapidly than in Northeast Asia. Join Carnegie for a discussion, hosted jointly with Nagasaki University, of the most urgent nuclear challenges facing international actors in this increasingly tense region.
Over the next decade, the spread and maturation of additive manufacturing could challenge major control mechanisms for inhibiting nuclear proliferation.