Strategic arms control is more vital than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Pragmatic negotiations toward a follow-on treaty need to begin now.
Where is nuclear arms control—negotiated restraints on the deadliest weapons of mass destruction—headed?
Russia is replacing older nuclear technology with more modern, more functional options. What are the implications for the United States, Europe, and the future of arms control?
While China may not think it has an interest in participating in major-power arms control now, pressures are building for it to do so. If Washington wants to engage constructively with Beijing, it should focus on concrete proposals to manage competition.
New START’s expiration will undermine U.S. security by removing all limits on Russia’s modernizing nuclear arsenal, by reducing our visibility into that arsenal. Extending New START will not create any new problems; the Treaty will continue to support U.S. national security goals
Why have numerous states that embarked on the path of developing nuclear weapons, or at least seriously toyed with the idea, never ultimately acquired them?
There is a vast gap between the United States and North Korea’s expectations and visions for the denuclearization negotiations. Artful compromise is needed to avoid an acrimonious break up.
New START is the last nuclear arms control pact left between the United States and Russia. If it isn’t extended, there will be no limits on either countries’ nuclear arsenals for the first time in decades.
China has long snubbed invitations to join U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control talks. Carnegie’s George Perkovich and a top Chinese nuclear expert discuss why the United States might regret it if China said yes.
Recent Iranian nuclear enrichment has doomed the JCPOA, prompting an opportunity for a new transformational agreement to take its place.