Though recent allegations of secrecy and illegal activity regarding the export of nuclear materials to Saudi Arabia raises important questions, faith in existing U.S. statutes and legislative oversight should not be shaken.
Economic factors alone cannot explain the development of South Korea’s nuclear energy industry.
Thomas Wood, Robert Otto, and Tristan Volpe will discuss their recent articles in The Nonproliferation Review on positive inducements for nuclear proliferation, safety, and security.
The regime for managing dual-use nuclear technology has proved remarkably successful to date, but it is becoming increasingly stressed and the prospects for buttressing it are bleak.
President Nazarbayev outlined his vision for a secure nuclear future, with a special focus on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the role of the IAEA Fuel Bank, and international efforts to curb nuclear terrorism.
The Nuclear Security Summit has made little progress on preventing the production of fissile material that has no plausible use. One way forward would be to establish a norm that such production should be consistent with reasonable civilian needs.
There is a serious risk that, within the next few years, Japan will produce more plutonium than it can use. The resulting buildup would set a damaging precedent, exacerbate regional tensions, and increase the likelihood of nuclear terrorism.
Japan has pledged not to produce more plutonium than it can consume. Serious questions are emerging, however, about whether it can uphold this commitment.
Japan’s plutonium production will soon exceed demand, creating a potentially destabilizing build-up.
The new civil nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and South Korea will provide a legal basis to allow the interdependent nuclear industry partnership between the two countries to continue and expand.