The increasingly blurred line between nuclear and conventional weapons heightens the danger of nuclear war.
The U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty poses significant implications for the future of European security, risking dangerous arms racing behavior among U.S., European, and Russian militaries.
It is not a good idea to mix nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems. What are the risks, and why are countries still doing it?
Pakistan’s nuclear policy is heavily influenced by 1960s NATO flexible response strategy, and has essentially imported its contradictions into Islamabad’s own. This emulation has raised serious questions about Pakistan’s “full-spectrum deterrence” credibility, deterrence stability and future measures to manage regional security competition.
With emerging challenges for the U.S.-China nuclear relationship, the United States can take important steps to prevent further destabilization.
Nuclear command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) systems are becoming increasingly vulnerable to nonnuclear attack, presenting significant escalation and entanglement challenges.
In recent years, China has expended considerable efforts to build a sea-based nuclear force for the primary purpose of enhancing its overall nuclear deterrent. Although Beijing’s goal is limited and defensive, the practical implications of its efforts for regional stability and security will be significant.
Why the United States does not currently have a long-term strategy for dealing with its most fundamental foreign policy challenges and why it needs one.
The risk of nuclear use is increasing, and not only as a result of politics. Changes in military doctrine and technology—especially in the context of growing multipolarity—also drive this risk.
In a conflict between Russia and NATO in the Baltic, the risks of escalation leading to nuclear use—deliberately, inadvertently, or accidentally—would be dangerously high. NATO must enhance deterrence against Russia while simultaneously pursuing resilience and risk-reduction measures.