With emerging challenges for the U.S.-China nuclear relationship, the United States can take important steps to prevent further destabilization.
Nuclear command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) systems are becoming increasingly vulnerable to nonnuclear attack, presenting significant escalation and entanglement challenges.
In recent years, China has expended considerable efforts to build a sea-based nuclear force for the primary purpose of enhancing its overall nuclear deterrent. Although Beijing’s goal is limited and defensive, the practical implications of its efforts for regional stability and security will be significant.
Why the United States does not currently have a long-term strategy for dealing with its most fundamental foreign policy challenges and why it needs one.
The risk of nuclear use is increasing, and not only as a result of politics. Changes in military doctrine and technology—especially in the context of growing multipolarity—also drive this risk.
In a conflict between Russia and NATO in the Baltic, the risks of escalation leading to nuclear use—deliberately, inadvertently, or accidentally—would be dangerously high. NATO must enhance deterrence against Russia while simultaneously pursuing resilience and risk-reduction measures.
Nowhere are nuclear dangers growing more rapidly than in Northeast Asia. Join Carnegie for a discussion, hosted jointly with Nagasaki University, of the most urgent nuclear challenges facing international actors in this increasingly tense region.
The rapidly changing security environment in Northeast Asia complicates any scholarly conjecture about the future of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence in the region.
This chapter explains how a challenger can leverage its latent capacity to produce nuclear weapons to extract coercive benefits from a stronger target such as the United States.
The president’s unilateral nuclear authority comes from decisions made at the start of the Atomic Age.