After Trump's withdrawal from the INF Treaty, Europeans should cooperate with East Asia to prevent a new arms race
Though some view the collapse of the INF Treaty as a sign of the end of arms control, there are several avenues that exist to preserve the arms control legacy of the treaty.
The increasingly blurred line between nuclear and conventional weapons heightens the danger of nuclear war.
The U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty poses significant implications for the future of European security, risking dangerous arms racing behavior among U.S., European, and Russian militaries.
It is not a good idea to mix nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems. What are the risks, and why are countries still doing it?
Pakistan’s nuclear policy is heavily influenced by 1960s NATO flexible response strategy, and has essentially imported its contradictions into Islamabad’s own. This emulation has raised serious questions about Pakistan’s “full-spectrum deterrence” credibility, deterrence stability and future measures to manage regional security competition.
With emerging challenges for the U.S.-China nuclear relationship, the United States can take important steps to prevent further destabilization.
Nuclear command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) systems are becoming increasingly vulnerable to nonnuclear attack, presenting significant escalation and entanglement challenges.
With the threat of nuclear war growing, China, Russia, and the United States should not wait until political relations improve before making efforts to manage new technologies.
Nonnuclear weapons are increasingly able to threaten dual-use command, control, communication, and intelligence assets that are spaced based or distant from probable theaters of conflict.