With the threat of nuclear war growing, China, Russia, and the United States should not wait until political relations improve before making efforts to manage new technologies.
Nonnuclear weapons are increasingly able to threaten dual-use command, control, communication, and intelligence assets that are spaced based or distant from probable theaters of conflict.
In a conflict between Russia and NATO in the Baltic, the risks of escalation leading to nuclear use—deliberately, inadvertently, or accidentally—would be dangerously high. NATO must enhance deterrence against Russia while simultaneously pursuing resilience and risk-reduction measures.
The rapidly changing security environment in Northeast Asia complicates any scholarly conjecture about the future of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence in the region.
This chapter explains how a challenger can leverage its latent capacity to produce nuclear weapons to extract coercive benefits from a stronger target such as the United States.
In the 55 years since unseen nuclear bullets were dodged in the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States’ technical capabilities to gather intelligence have improved breathtakingly. Still, it is extremely difficult to know how foreign adversaries perceive their situation and calculate their moves.
The president’s unilateral nuclear authority comes from decisions made at the start of the Atomic Age.
Tensions with North Korea have grown under the administration of President Donald Trump, and the danger of nuclear confrontation is now higher than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis.
The perception that the United States is seeking the removal of the North Korean and Iranian governments has negative effects that remain underappreciated in Washington
The risk of an inadvertent nuclear war is rising because of the entanglement of non-nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons and their command-and-control capabilities.