Even though arms control cannot prevent deliberate escalation, at least confidence-and-security-building measures could diminish the risk of unintended escalation. But the political realities in Moscow and Washington are not promising for conventional arms control in Europe.
To reduce danger, we need less bombast and better communication.
Amid escalating tensions, South Koreans have begun voicing their concerns about a nuclear-armed North Korea-and debating bringing U.S. tactical nuclear weapons back to the Korean peninsula.
Deterring North Korea is less risky than a preventative war.
Kim Jong Un is likely to view President Trump much like his predecessors—as a president who doesn’t like North Korea’s nuclear capabilities but with few realistic options for stopping it.
North Korea’s motivations for pursuing nuclear capabilities have changed over time, but are rooted in a sense of existential threats coming from outside the regime.
The North Korean nuclear crisis is far from over, and foreclosing escalation pathways is in the best interests of the United States, its allies, and Pyongyang.
Tensions continue to mount between the U.S. and North Korea, prompting questions on the deterrence relationship and the reliability of North Korea's nuclear capabilities.
Uncertainty swirls around the U.S.-Russia nuclear relationship in light of new questions concerning Russian nuclear force advancement and the U.S. response.
Previous debates focusing on freezing North Korea's nuclear program are played out. Today, the main challenge is preventing North Korea from hurting the United States and its allies now that the Kim regime has long-range nuclear missiles.