Deterring North Korea is less risky than a preventative war.
Kim Jong Un is likely to view President Trump much like his predecessors—as a president who doesn’t like North Korea’s nuclear capabilities but with few realistic options for stopping it.
North Korea’s motivations for pursuing nuclear capabilities have changed over time, but are rooted in a sense of existential threats coming from outside the regime.
The North Korean nuclear crisis is far from over, and foreclosing escalation pathways is in the best interests of the United States, its allies, and Pyongyang.
Tensions continue to mount between the U.S. and North Korea, prompting questions on the deterrence relationship and the reliability of North Korea's nuclear capabilities.
Uncertainty swirls around the U.S.-Russia nuclear relationship in light of new questions concerning Russian nuclear force advancement and the U.S. response.
Previous debates focusing on freezing North Korea's nuclear program are played out. Today, the main challenge is preventing North Korea from hurting the United States and its allies now that the Kim regime has long-range nuclear missiles.
For India and Pakistan, two states with roughly equal amounts of nuclear arsenals, words matter.
Which arguments could help to reinvigorate moral and political support for further nuclear disarmament?
For NATO, balancing deterrence and assurance measures to its easternmost allies without entering a new arms race is an urgent task.