The probability of nuclear terrorism may not be high, but the Nuclear Security Summit raises the awareness of states with nuclear materials and encourages real commitments toward preventing a nuclear terrorist attack.
The United States and India recently concluded arrangements for the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. This removes one of the final hurdles to fully implementing the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear deal, which exempted India from nuclear trade restrictions and has exacerbated nuclear tensions in South Asia.
Improving the reliability of nuclear fuel supplies is best achieved by giving priority to fuel leasing contracts coupled with long-term generic export licenses, and last resort multilateral fuel supply arrangements.
Nuclear power is not without risks, both from nuclear waste and the possible proliferation of nuclear fuel for weapons, and its cost and build-out time make it a partial solution, at best, to climate change.
Expectations of a nuclear energy renaissance are particularly high in the United States, but government programs to jump start new reactor construction will likely not be enough to spark more than a handful of reactors by 2015.
The specter of nuclear proliferation must be understood as both a political issue and a technological one; the intent of would-be proliferators needs to be addressed together with the science.
James Acton and co-authors present an overview of the role of fissile material control in nuclear disarmament. They review past efforts to securing disarmament and discuss the major challenges facing the elimination of nuclear weapons today.
The Russian, Israeli, Iranian and U.S. positions on Iran’s nuclear ambitions are open to several interpretations. The most realistic endgame scenario to best serve the chief interests of all players is one in which Iran maintains the ability to produce a nuclear weapon but refrains from testing one.
When Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO's secretary-general, addresses an audience at Carnegie Europe on Friday, 18th September, he will speak about the possibility of a new dialogue between two former foes – NATO and Russia. Dmitri Trenin suggests that these discussions could initially take place through the NATO-Russia Council of 2002, but in time, that they might spawn a new framework altogether.
Pierre Goldschmidt analyzes two IAEA reports on assurances of nuclear fuel supply. There are several inadequacies in both reports, Dr. Goldschmidt argues, and the Board of Governors should seek clarification on them before it might be asked to endorse potentially important proposals.