Rules for the Nuclear Renaissance was part of Carnegie's 2007 Nonproliferation Conference. It was chaired by Sharon Squassoni, Carnegie Endowment; Peter Bradford, formerly with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Charles Ferguson, Council on Foreign Relations;Corey Hinderstein, Nuclear Threat Initiative; Henry Sokolski, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.
2007 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference Panel: The Future of Nuclear Weapons: A View from the Hill.
2007 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference Panel: Deterrence or Disarmament: The Future of Nuclear Weapons in China, France, and the UK.
Those who favor a diplomatic solution to the present crisis over Iran's nuclear ambitions should nevertheless realize that to ignore Iran’s defiance of UN Security Council resolutions is to tacitly support it, and doing so weakens the credibility of the non-proliferation regime and, in the end, increases the risk of nuclear proliferation, tensions, and violence in the region and beyond.
Reading William Langewiesche's new book is like going to a concert and discovering that your favorite rock star is having an off night. The sublime talent rings through in a few electric riffs. The voice registers the deep truth of heavy experience in two or three places. But the show doesn't hold together from start to finish.
Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon was in Washington last week to save the troubled U.S.-India nuclear deal. U.S. negotiators should ensure that the peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement meets the letter and spirit of that law. Anything Less should be rejected by Congress.
(Guest analysis by Bruno Dupré)
One of the most useful things I learned at the Kennedy School of Government several years ago was about leadership and negotiation. Charisma, persuasiveness, and a high tolerance for ambiguity are certainly helpful for a successful negotiation, but by no means sufficient. It is also necessary to diagnose parties’ motivations, zones of potential agreement, possible alternatives, coalitions that could shift power in desired directions, and the best possible process for managing difficult negotiations. Without this methodology one can only hope for the best. But planning each element of a negotiation process increases the odds of success.
I left Harvard just as the EU-3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) entered negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. Three years later, the world is still looking for the best way to get out of this crisis. Tehran keeps refusing to comply with IAEA and UN demands, using all kinds of pressure, from denying access to UN inspectors (January 27, 2007) to threatening the very existence of Israel. Many fear uncontrolled escalation in the region and beyond. The consensus maintained so far seems to be deteriorating suddenly. It is useful, at this critical moment, to recall the rationale of the EU approach. Even if success is far from being guaranteed, there is, for the time being, no better alternative. (Read More)
The international community must reject the passive notion that more countries are unavoidably destined to acquire nuclear weapons, and instead must implement further measures to dissuade and deter non-nuclear weapon states from seeking such weapons.