While new manufacturing technology could increase the efficiency and visibility of nuclear supply-chain operations, the steady trend toward digitization and interconnection could result in unacceptable cyber risks, ranging from the loss of sensitive proprietary information to the spread of compromised components throughout nuclear infrastructure.
The risk of nuclear use is increasing, and not only as a result of politics. Changes in military doctrine and technology—especially in the context of growing multipolarity—also drive this risk.
Netanyahu presumably only presented a small fraction of what he has but what he presented seemed largely consistent with what the International Atomic Energy Agency had previously reported.
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania all face the constant threat of Russian intimidation and meddling in their internal affairs.
The upcoming Trump-Kim Summit was made possible through the efforts of South Korean officials led by President Moon. Further help from them will be crucial.
If one had to choose the most exceptional year in the history of the IAEA safeguards regime, it would be 2003. That year saw four events which, after 15 years, point to important lessons for the nonproliferation community, particular for the governments seeking to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
How well do the existing theories about nuclear proliferation predict North Korea’s successful nuclearization?
Cyber, like the nuclear field, is now a leading means through which international relations play out today.
Before the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded in 2017, the G20 countries’ reactions to the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty were based on their own interests and loyalties.
The world is vastly different from when the nuclear order was built: proliferation risks and interest in nuclear energy are much lower, but regional insecurities raise danger of escalatory warfare. Meanwhile, the have/have not inequities impair cooperation to restore the foundation of order.