Cyber, like the nuclear field, is now a leading means through which international relations play out today.
This chapter explains how a challenger can leverage its latent capacity to produce nuclear weapons to extract coercive benefits from a stronger target such as the United States.
In this article, Tristan Volpe reviews Rachel Whitlark’s article, “Nuclear Beliefs: A Leader-Focused Theory of Counter-Proliferation.”
Before the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded in 2017, the G20 countries’ reactions to the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty were based on their own interests and loyalties.
The world is vastly different from when the nuclear order was built: proliferation risks and interest in nuclear energy are much lower, but regional insecurities raise danger of escalatory warfare. Meanwhile, the have/have not inequities impair cooperation to restore the foundation of order.
Unlike during the Cold War, critical decision-making in the Nuclear Suppliers Group today is beset by its members' geo-strategic politics today for very specific reasons.
The risk of an inadvertent nuclear war is rising because of the entanglement of non-nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons and their command-and-control capabilities.
A retrospective of President Putin’s early political life to interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election to his relationship with President Trump.
The Nobel Committee awarded its annual peace prize to the laudable goal of nuclear disarmament. But civil society actors and governments concerned about disarmament should not be tempted to rest on the laurels of this achievement.
Instead of putting the JCPOA in jeopardy, the United States would be well advised to permit the implementation of the agreement to go forward and, together with other parties, encourage the IAEA to vigorously pursue its obligations under the agreement.