While the media has focused on recent allegations of a secret uranium deal between Zimbabwe and Iran, the real story of Iran’s efforts to obtain secondary uranium sources is a much more complicated one.
The Nuclear Security Summits in Washington in 2010 and Seoul in 2012 began the process of international engagement on the challenge of securing existing fissile material vulnerable to theft and diversion by non-state or terrorist groups.
The nuclear landscape in South Asia is dynamic, a complex mixture of politics, technology, and emotion. Analysis of these issues is often overshadowed by partisanship and hyperbole.
The governments driving the new Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative should consider pressing states to clarify the roles they assign to nuclear weapons and exploring a standard of use.
What are the West’s current options for dealing with Iran and what does a nuclear agreement need to include for it to be acceptable to both the West and Tehran?
The 2012 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee in Vienna will be the first meeting of States Parties to assess global progress and build on the success of 2010.
One topic of discussion at the upcoming five-year treaty Review Conference meeting in Vienna will be how best to universalize the Additional Protocol for safeguards among the 185 non-nuclear-weapon states Party to the Treaty.
Ambassador Susan Burk, special representative of the president for nuclear nonproliferation, discussed progress on implementing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Action Plan, adopted at the 2010 Review Conference to strengthen the Treaty’s three pillars.
The nuclear order is under pressure as the distance between nonaligned states and nuclear weapon states grows.
Given that products that rely on the same technologies and materials as weapons of mass destruction are everywhere, the challenge for states is to ensure that trade in dual-use goods and technologies does not contribute to WMD proliferation.