One of the main outstanding loopholes of the international nonproliferation regime that deserves prompt attention is the absence of a requirement for irreversible IAEA safeguards to remain in force should a state leave the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
The realization that nuclear technology is, at its core, dual-use in nature occurred early on in the nuclear age, and it has been fundamental to every effort to harness the positive potential widely believed to be inherent in nuclear technology, while minimizing its risks.
Negotiators from the P5+1 and Iran have agreed to extend the talks on Iran’s nuclear program to June 2015. Many issues are still to be solved, such as establishing a formula for verifiably limiting Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity as well as an acceptable process for relieving sanctions. Still, all parties to the talks have stressed the need to reach a comprehensive agreement.
Nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, and the threat of nuclear terrorism are among the most critical challenges facing the world today.
Proposed revisions to the U.S. rules governing nuclear technology transfers do much to accommodate commercial interests without compromising national security.
While the media has focused on recent allegations of a secret uranium deal between Zimbabwe and Iran, the real story of Iran’s efforts to obtain secondary uranium sources is a much more complicated one.
The Nuclear Security Summits in Washington in 2010 and Seoul in 2012 began the process of international engagement on the challenge of securing existing fissile material vulnerable to theft and diversion by non-state or terrorist groups.
The nuclear landscape in South Asia is dynamic, a complex mixture of politics, technology, and emotion. Analysis of these issues is often overshadowed by partisanship and hyperbole.
The governments driving the new Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative should consider pressing states to clarify the roles they assign to nuclear weapons and exploring a standard of use.
What are the West’s current options for dealing with Iran and what does a nuclear agreement need to include for it to be acceptable to both the West and Tehran?