Though a terrorist attack using nuclear or radiological material may be a low-probability threat, the consequences would extend to every country on Earth, not just the one on whose territory the event took place.
The Iran nuclear crisis challenged the IAEA at a critical time in the evolution of its safeguards system.
The Iran nuclear deal has yielded neither a verifiable Iranian commitment to restrict its nuclear endeavors to the parameters of a peaceful energy program, nor a mechanism that reliably prevents Iran from funneling the enormous unfrozen funds provided to it to all the wrong causes.
Beyond routine safeguards, the IAEA will continue to address with Iran allegations concerning so-called “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear programme.
If all goes according to plan, sometime in the fall of 2023, the European Union and the United States will terminate the second of three tranches of nuclear sanctions against Iran, and Iran will initiate parliamentary ratification of its Additional Protocol for IAEA safeguards.
Under the terms agreed to in Vienna, the country is going to be crawling with inspectors. No one is covertly building a nuclear weapon under this regime.
Long before a final Iran nuclear agreement was on the horizon, plans have been afoot to generalize the hoped-for results of diplomacy far beyond the borders of the Islamic Republic.
After 18 months of negotiations, one of the remaining challenges to reaching a nuclear deal with Iran is the extent to which Tehran must “come clean” about the history of its nuclear program and, in particular, about apparent efforts to design a nuclear weapon.
South Korea stands in a unique position among the global nuclear elite: it is the top user of nuclear power that is not also a nuclear weapon state.
Any interpretation that pits Washington and Seoul against each other fails to understand the fundamental spirit of cooperation that reaffirms and undergirds the U.S.-ROK nuclear relationship.