In responding to the challenge of nuclear proliferation, nuclear trade controls and nuclear disarmament have separate missions.
Ongoing and difficult diplomacy with Iran does not provide U.S. lawmakers with grounds to require potential 123 partners not to enrich uranium or reprocess reactor fuel as a matter of principle. That would seriously endanger 123 agreements in some cases.
In the near future—possibly within the next twelve months—Japan will face two genuinely tough choices: whether to commission the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant and whether to sell nuclear reactor components to India.
Shares of Urenco, a pioneering developer of gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment, may soon change hands, but a sale of the company is unlikely to increase the risk of proliferation.
The U.S. government should not require all foreign countries with which it concludes new nuclear cooperation agreements to legally commit themselves not to enrich uranium and reprocess spent fuel.
Proposed revisions to the U.S. rules governing nuclear technology transfers do much to accommodate commercial interests without compromising national security.
Pakistani luminaries met with Chinese luminaries a few months ago, and their handshake will translate into a brand new 1,000-MW power reactor–Kanupp-2–being plunked down into the middle of Pakistan’s mega-metropolis Karachi.
The latter half of 2013 will be critical for Japan’s nuclear future.
During the coming week, the United States and South Korea will again attack the sticking point that since 2011 has bedeviled the negotiation of a new bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement.
The acute tension on the Korean peninsula is threatening critical negotiations on peaceful nuclear cooperation between the United States and South Korea.