Chinese plans to flout global rules on nuclear trade by building two reactors in Pakistan are emblematic of Beijing's growing nuclear assertiveness and threatens to undermine the nonproliferation regime.
China’s plans to sell new nuclear reactors to Pakistan are fundamentally different from the U.S.-India nuclear deal. Determined opposition from the United States can convince Beijing to reconsider.
With the cooperation of the United States and other advanced nuclear countries, Saudi Arabia's budding nuclear energy program would directly challenge Iran's aspirations for regional leadership in nuclear power.
China’s commitment to provide Pakistan with two additional civilian nuclear reactors has created great unease in the international nonproliferation community. While some compare this assurance to the U.S.- India nuclear cooperation agreement, the differences between the two are significant.
India and the United States share common values which contribute to a natural bond between the world’s largest democracy and the world’s oldest one. While the two countries may disagree on specific issues, such as patenting intellectual property, both face large challenges that can only be solved by science.
South Korea's recent success in winning contracts for building civilian nuclear power reactors in the UAE is likely to inflate its expectations for renegotiating the terms of its bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States.
There are growing concerns that China and the United States are on a collision course over Chinese plans to build two nuclear reactors in the Punjab province of Pakistan.
In light of the 2008 U.S.–India deal, which exempted India from the nuclear trade guidelines set by the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the NSG now faces a delicate balancing act in confronting the possibility of a China-Pakistan nuclear deal.
Preventing the civilian nuclear fuel cycle from contributing to proliferation is an integral part of the disarmament challenge. The nuclear industry should participate positively in efforts to advance nonproliferation tools rather than seek to distance itself from this challenge.
Conditioning Japanese nuclear cooperation with India on India's nuclear testing restraint would be a reasonable compromise among Japanese interests and among those of its foreign nuclear partners and India, and a significant gain over the status quo.