If uranium supplier states are deterred from accounting for their uranium in India, that would inform all NPT parties that have pledged to renounce nuclear weapons that it doesn’t matter whether nuclear goods, sold on condition that they will be used peacefully, might be used to make deadly arms.
The projected growth in the use of nuclear power worldwide creates new opportunities for deepening and expanding existing U.S.-South Korean collaboration to promote the civil uses of nuclear energy in third countries. This expansion can build on the cooperation that is already taking place.
The narrow technical disagreements stalling the renegotiation of the U.S.–South Korea nuclear cooperation agreement mask a far larger and more complicated set of issues and interests that challenge both the future of bilateral nuclear cooperation and the nonproliferation regime.
Despite undergoing some delays, Iran’s construction of a new heavy water reactor to the northwest of the city of Arak could eventually match the proliferation risk posed by the country’s uranium enrichment program.
The single most costly U.S. nonproliferation program currently underway faces a cloudy future in Washington.
The latter half of 2013 will be critical for Japan’s nuclear future.
Iran could process its entire inventory of 20%-enriched U3O8 to produce UF6 in a matter of a few weeks, the fruit of Iran's cumulative nuclear chemistry R&D and industrial-scale experience over three decades.
The acute tension on the Korean peninsula is threatening critical negotiations on peaceful nuclear cooperation between the United States and South Korea.
The Asia-Pacific region epitomizes the type of proliferation challenges the international community faces.
Taiwan's resolve not to enrich or reprocess has nothing to do with the "gold standard" and nearly everything to do with U.S. leverage over Taiwan's security arrangements.