There is no clear, internationally accepted definition of what activities or technologies constitute a nuclear weapons program. This lack of definition encumbers nuclear energy cooperation and complicates peaceful resolution of proliferation disputes.
The concept of ‘virtual nuclear abolition’ appeals to the same realist self-help arguments that are normally invoked to explain why nuclear disarmament is neither feasible nor desirable.
China and South Korea should delve deeper into the technical and operational aspects of THAAD to find a cooperative solution.
With India and Pakistan close to the brink of confrontation, the subcontinent presents an illuminating study in what happens when traditional assumptions about deterrence no longer hold.
Since the end of WWII, the popular view in the U.S. has been that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki precipitated Japan’s surrender on August 15. However, many historians believe that the attack on Japan-occupied Manchuria by the previously neutral Soviet Union on August 8 had more impact on Japan’s leaders.
Should the United States do more to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategy and the number of weapons in its arsenal?
Four scenarios for the future as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action approaches its one year mark.
The nuclear agreement with Iran includes innovations that could bolster confidence that other countries’ nuclear programs will be exclusively peaceful.
The global nuclear order appears increasingly tense, primarily because many states feel that the structure and distribution of benefits is unjust. Among the states that will determine how the nuclear order will adapt, Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and Pakistan are particularly important.
A substantial gap exists between Indian offensive conventional military planning for Pakistan contingencies and its defensive nuclear policy that seeks to deter aggression with threat of massive retaliation.