Since the end of WWII, the popular view in the U.S. has been that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki precipitated Japan’s surrender on August 15. However, many historians believe that the attack on Japan-occupied Manchuria by the previously neutral Soviet Union on August 8 had more impact on Japan’s leaders.
Should the United States do more to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategy and the number of weapons in its arsenal?
Four scenarios for the future as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action approaches its one year mark.
The nuclear agreement with Iran includes innovations that could bolster confidence that other countries’ nuclear programs will be exclusively peaceful.
The global nuclear order appears increasingly tense, primarily because many states feel that the structure and distribution of benefits is unjust. Among the states that will determine how the nuclear order will adapt, Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and Pakistan are particularly important.
A substantial gap exists between Indian offensive conventional military planning for Pakistan contingencies and its defensive nuclear policy that seeks to deter aggression with threat of massive retaliation.
It is important that scholars and practitioners from the region think about the evolution of deterrence between India and Pakistan and how nuclear confidence building measures can contribute to stability.
What does President Obama’s visit to Hiroshima mean for his nuclear legacy?
The growing prominence of nuclear weapons in Pakistan’s national security strategy casts a shadow of nuclear use over any potential military strategy India might consider to strike this balance. However, augmenting its nuclear options with tactical nuclear weapons is unlikely to bolster Indian deterrence in convincing ways.
Chinese nuclear experts think about nuclear weapons very differently from their U.S. counterparts. How can Washington and Beijing promote an effective dialogue despite their disparate approaches?