South Korea and the United States have become essential partners on nuclear matters over the last forty years. However, as with all maturing relationships, there remain differences of view and priority that must be managed.
Pakistan’s military leadership can choose to accept success in achieving a “strategic” deterrent against India, or it can choose to continue to compete with India in the pursuit of “full spectrum” deterrence.
The 2015 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference brought together over 800 experts and officials from more than 45 countries and international organizations to discuss emerging trends in nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, deterrence, and nuclear energy.
Is the salience of nuclear topics viewed differently by subject-matter experts than it is by elite opinion shapers? A survey of nuclear-themed editorials and policy articles published between 2001 and 2013.
As India and Pakistan develop their naval nuclear forces, they will enter increasingly murky waters. By further institutionalizing relations between their navies, both countries may succeed in adding a greater degree of stability to a dangerously volatile maritime environment.
In the book “Managing India’s Nuclear Forces,” Verghese Koithara explores the real-life challenges of nuclear maturity with clinical insight and exemplary balance.
In the nuclear realm, suggesting that first-use is unthinkable is misleading.
The security landscape in South Asia is changing radically due to the introduction of new nuclear and conventional military capabilities by both India and Pakistan.
The Indian tradition of strategic nonviolence, however imperfect, is less risky and more conducive to long-term success than a militaristic strategy to counter terrorism in a nuclearized environment.
The instability in South Asia can be best understood in triangular terms, with China at the apex and India and Pakistan at the end points of the base.