The Indian tradition of strategic nonviolence, however imperfect, is less risky and more conducive to long-term success than a militaristic strategy to counter terrorism in a nuclearized environment.
The instability in South Asia can be best understood in triangular terms, with China at the apex and India and Pakistan at the end points of the base.
Any shift away from no-first use is likely to be viewed by the United States and its allies—rightly or wrongly—as provocative.
A recent Chinese white paper on defense omits a promise that China will never use nuclear weapons first, an explicit pledge had been the cornerstone of Beijing’s stated nuclear policy for the last half-century.
Tensions with North Korea are rising as the United States strengthens its missile defense in response to threats.
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has used strong words against North Korea after the country threatened to attack the United States.
President Barack Obama should articulate a narrowed framework for the legitimate use of nuclear weapons that the United States believes would be defensible for others to follow as long as nuclear weapons remain.
In China, nonproliferation continues to be framed as an excuse behind which Washington and its allies are able to engage in provocative and destabilizing acts.
For denizens of the southern half of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea's third nuclear test was so threatening that it has moved onto center stage a once-fringe debate about whether South Korea should acquire nuclear weapons of its own.
Although the Obama administration has pledged to formulate its nuclear policy around the concept of strategic stability, there is major disagreement on the meaning of concept and whether it is a sound basis for policy.