Militarily, the antiquated tactical U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe serve little to no purpose to NATO. But they remain a valuable bargaining chip and a strong symbol of U.S. security assurance to its European allies and partners.
The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review offers a number of hints on how Washington might influence the future of NATO's nuclear policy.
Nuclear disarmament must become a shared responsibility by identifying the role that non-nuclear-weapon state allies of the United States can play. Specifically, these states should engage with the United States on doctrine and with the NPT Review Conference on deterrence.
The prospect of enforcing a ban on the possession or use of nuclear weapons would require addressing similar difficulties to those faced in abolishing nuclear weapons entirely.
The Obama administration has released the highly anticipated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The reactions of key nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states to this document will help determine whether the NPR will advance U.S. and international security.
Governments should commission their defense research institutions to assess whether and how multilateral nuclear disarmament could be managed in nuclear-armed states to reach lower numbers.
The Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review reflects modern reality and gives momentum to President Obama's long-term goal of living in a world without nuclear weapons.
The Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review gives much-needed momentum to the nuclear agenda President Obama set out in Prague last year.
The goal of nuclear superiority is unattainable. Instead, the United States can enhance its security by giving nuclear-armed adversaries strong incentives for restraint in a crisis.
Although the atomic bomb poses profound challenges to American constitutional governance, the post-Cold War environment should allow alternative ways to balance nuclear deterrence with a deliberative decision-making process that does not put nuclear weapons solely in the hands of the executive branch.