As European and international security experience transitional changes, it remains to be seen whether the United Kingdom will be able to continue to pursue a nuclear strategy defined by deterrence at the lowest possible levels of conflict.
While security conditions in Europe remain relatively benign, NATO states should recapitalize their security commitments and clarify their crisis decisionmaking procedures.
As Washington and Beijing continue to build on decades of successful strategic nuclear discussions, the U.S. military must find a way to promote a more effective dialogue with China’s military.
Even after the world reaches the long-for goal of zero nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence will continue to have a vital policy role for some time to come.
Calls for Seoul to seek deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea have become frequent in recent months, spurred in great measure by North Korea's shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010.
Congressman Michael Turner spoke on the House defense act and its relation to the New START agreement, further nuclear reductions, U.S. nuclear targeting strategy, missile defense, and non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe.
After two decades of stagnation, Russia and the United States have pledged their support for reductions in nuclear warheads. But the vision of mutual disarmament remains plagued by doubts on all sides.
As NATO debates its future nuclear policy, it should focus on concrete measures to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent in the medium term and avoid abstract debates over complete disarmament or the need to keep nuclear weapons indefinitely.
The 2011 conference focused on new actors and new agendas, reflecting the need to develop cooperative responses to challenges being posed by changing technology, distributions of political power, interest in nuclear energy, and security conditions in key regions.
As U.S. policy seeks to create the conditions that would allow for deep reductions in nuclear arsenals, the United States and Russia can undertake a practical approach to their stockpiles to 500 nuclear warheads each and those of other nuclear-armed states to no more than about half that number.