Although Russia, the United States, and American allies have been loath to downsize their nuclear arsenals, deep reductions would not undermine a nation’s security since arsenal size has little bearing on effectiveness of deterrence.
The Russian Duma’s likely ratification of New START Agreement this month will open a new debate over the strategic arms threats and emergent arms control opportunities that might be usefully added to the President's current arms control agenda.
The Lisbon NATO summit is a critical event for making the Alliance between Europe and North America fit the security challenges of the twenty-first century.
As NATO grapples with the future of its deterrence posture, it faces the contentious question of whether reducing or withdrawing forward-based U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe would unacceptably reduce the security of its member states.
U.S. nuclear strategy would have to change in order to enable deep reductions in nuclear weapon numbers and U.S. allies have a role in facilitating such a change.
Sasha Polakow-Suransky and Avner Cohen discuss the history of Israeli-South African nuclear cooperation and the future of Israel's nuclear posture.
The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review defines China as a partner for international cooperation, but also expresses concerns about the modernization of China's nuclear arsenal, the lack of transparency, and its future intentions.
Militarily, the antiquated tactical U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe serve little to no purpose to NATO. But they remain a valuable bargaining chip and a strong symbol of U.S. security assurance to its European allies and partners.
The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review offers a number of hints on how Washington might influence the future of NATO's nuclear policy.
Nuclear disarmament must become a shared responsibility by identifying the role that non-nuclear-weapon state allies of the United States can play. Specifically, these states should engage with the United States on doctrine and with the NPT Review Conference on deterrence.