The reported agreement to refuel the Tehran research reactor by shipping Iranian-made low enriched uranium to other states for further enrichment and fuel fabrication could be a good precedent for meeting Iran's future and potentially larger nuclear fuel needs.
The United States and Russia need a coordinated approach to Iranian nuclear ambitions, where sanctions and opportunities become incentives pushing and pulling Iran toward a solution beneficial for both global security and Iran’s national interest.
In the aftermath of the P5+1 nuclear talks in Geneva, the focus should be on finding a face-saving arrangement in which Iran could enrich uranium, but below the high enrichment levels needed for nuclear weapons.
In the P5+1 talks at Geneva, Iran agreed to have low enriched uranium from its Natanz site further enriched abroad and fabricated into fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor. Yet technical problems could derail this initiative.
Better protection of U.S. forces and allies against the Iranian missile threat is reason enough to welcome the shift in U.S. missile defense policy. Improving the prospects for future progress in reducing the threat from Russia is icing on the cake.
Unity among the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany will be key during this week's nuclear talks with Iran in Geneva. But can the P5+1 convince Iran that this time the international community means business?
Proposed economic sanctions on Iran should focus on undermining the Islamic regime rather than stopping its nuclear program.
The disclosure of the clandestine enrichment facility at Qom puts the spotlight back on Iran to answer for their illegal nuclear activities. While sanctions will not succeed in forcing Iran to halt enrichment, they could help make Iran negotiate the conditions under which they would continue enriching.
The Iranian nuclear program continues to be a major foreign policy challenge for the Obama administration. Changing the behavior of the regime will most likely require a change in its character.
Iran's covert centrifuge facility at Qom was clearly better suited to military ends than the IAEA-monitored facility at Natanz. Serious questions remain about whether Iran could be hiding other parts of its nuclear infrastructure.