While the decision of President Donald Trump to walk away from the INF Treaty drew a heated response from policy pundits in Washington, European analysts hold hope that the U.S. and Russia may resolve issues with the treaty this week.
In recent years, China has expended considerable efforts to build a sea-based nuclear force for the primary purpose of enhancing its overall nuclear deterrent. Although Beijing’s goal is limited and defensive, the practical implications of its efforts for regional stability and security will be significant.
Saudi Arabia took concrete steps to adopt a nuclear hedge strategy against Iran, and explore options to forestall a looming arms race in the Middle East over the buildup of nuclear latency.
The risk of nuclear use is increasing, and not only as a result of politics. Changes in military doctrine and technology—especially in the context of growing multipolarity—also drive this risk.
Nuclear disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation policies are increasingly affected by declining regional security, increasing militarization of U.S. foreign policy, and changes to the global normative nuclear order.
The risks for a Trump-Kim summit remain high, and Trump’s notorious inconsistency and irritability cannot be dismissed.
As North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and ballistic missile capabilities mature, Washington should pursue a comprehensive and verified capping of Pyongyang’s nuclear program, pending total denuclearization at a later date.
John Bolton wants regime change in North Korea and Iran, and he’ll do whatever it takes to get it.
It would be a mistake to assume that China’s future nuclear power development will continue on the same trajectory as during the last twenty years.