Seoul wants to try diplomacy with Pyongyang. Where does that leave Washington?
Ellsberg’s The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner is an easy, fast-paced read about nuclear practices relevant today, especially in the newest nuclear-armed states—India, Pakistan and North Korea.
A “Gold Standard” nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia may not be the best way for the United States to balance against Russia and China or restore its influence over nonproliferation policy in the Middle East.
This chapter explains how a challenger can leverage its latent capacity to produce nuclear weapons to extract coercive benefits from a stronger target such as the United States.
In this article, Tristan Volpe reviews Rachel Whitlark’s article, “Nuclear Beliefs: A Leader-Focused Theory of Counter-Proliferation.”
In the 55 years since unseen nuclear bullets were dodged in the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States’ technical capabilities to gather intelligence have improved breathtakingly. Still, it is extremely difficult to know how foreign adversaries perceive their situation and calculate their moves.
The world is vastly different from when the nuclear order was built: proliferation risks and interest in nuclear energy are much lower, but regional insecurities raise danger of escalatory warfare. Meanwhile, the have/have not inequities impair cooperation to restore the foundation of order.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has released a report estimating that the nuclear force plans that the Trump administration inherited from its predecessor would cost $1.2 trillion between 2017 and 2046, and outlining options to reduce or delays costs.
The perception that the United States is seeking the removal of the North Korean and Iranian governments has negative effects that remain underappreciated in Washington
The risk of an inadvertent nuclear war is rising because of the entanglement of non-nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons and their command-and-control capabilities.