A U.S.-Russian arms race in strategic conventional weapons is an unfortunate possibility, but it is not an inevitability.
Even if the interim deal with Iran is successfully extended into a comprehensive agreement during the next twelve months, Tehran’s conduct in the Middle East will remain largely unregulated.
No decision has yet been made about which missions the Conventional Prompt Global Strike would be used for, but there are several possibilities floating around.
In one area of military technology, a new and potentially dangerous arms race is brewing and a crisis could touch off rapid and uncontrollable escalation.
The world today is a very different place than it was barely twelve years ago when the war against al-Qaeda and its affiliates began. Continuing advances in various spheres such as the sociotechnical world will present both challenges and opportunities.
Despite repeated assertions that Conventional Prompt Global Strike will be a niche capability, not intended to affect U.S. strategic balances with other countries, Beijing does not fully trust these assurances.
The Indian tradition of strategic nonviolence, however imperfect, is less risky and more conducive to long-term success than a militaristic strategy to counter terrorism in a nuclearized environment.
Decision- and policy-makers need a set of revised influence and deterrence tools and approaches that are applicable to the modern security environment.
There is still a window of opportunity for cooperation between the United States and Russia on conventional prompt global strike weapons.
Any Conventional Prompt Global Strike acquisition decision should be preceded by an in-depth and detailed debate about the costs, risks, and benefits of all potential CPGS alternatives. Their military utility is a natural starting point for such a debate.