Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
North Korea’s evolving nuclear arsenal presents a complex security challenge. What can states and international organizations do to reduce immediate nuclear risks while planning for a longer term disarmament process?
If President Donald Trump wants to make his upcoming Beijing summit meeting with President Xi Jinping successful, it is time to take a step back and reflect on his overall approach to solicit China’s cooperation.
South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s announcement that he would resume the construction of two nuclear reactors which had been temporarily halted since mid-July will have a more complicated effect on South Korea’s long-term energy policy.
Economic factors alone cannot explain the development of South Korea’s nuclear energy industry.
Could a president’s overconfidence in U.S. defensive systems lead to deadly miscalculation and nuclear armageddon? Yes, it could.
If there were real military or political benefits to redeploying nuclear weapons in South Korea, this idea would be worth a serious review, but redeploying them today makes no sense, and indeed could exacerbate the current crisis over North Korea’s nuclear threats.
To reduce danger, we need less bombast and better communication.
Pressure by the United States was less decisive in forcing South Korea to ratify the NPT in 1975 than commonly assumed.
Amid escalating tensions, South Koreans have begun voicing their concerns about a nuclear-armed North Korea-and debating bringing U.S. tactical nuclear weapons back to the Korean peninsula.
For a new nuclear state like North Korea, questions concerning strategic implementation abound.
Deterring North Korea is less risky than a preventative war.