The advent of cyber warfare exacerbates the risk that conventional wars could inadvertently lead to the use of nuclear weapons.
Proliferators take advantage of formal financial institutions to enable surreptitious nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs. Despite a number of challenges for financial institutions, they can be critical in the fight against illicit activity.
In holding out for the big deal, unfortunately, the Trump administration—like its predecessors—sacrificed a more immediate and necessary operational objective: stopping North Korean progress toward a larger and more menacing nuclear arsenal that could reliably target the mainland United States.
Although Turkey is not likely to pursue a nuclear weapons program, it is expanding its nuclear industry by partnering with Russia.
Why have numerous states that embarked on the path of developing nuclear weapons, or at least seriously toyed with the idea, never ultimately acquired them?
Japan and South Korea have long been identified as likely cases of future nuclear weapon proliferation. Why have leaders of both states eschewed the pursuit of nuclear weapons?
There is a vast gap between the United States and North Korea’s expectations and visions for the denuclearization negotiations. Artful compromise is needed to avoid an acrimonious break up.
India recently appeared to nullify its no-first-use nuclear doctrine in the midst of tensions with Pakistan. This shift will have wider geopolitical implications for its neighbors.
Recent Iranian nuclear enrichment has doomed the JCPOA, prompting an opportunity for a new transformational agreement to take its place.
The legality of nuclear weapons, nuclear war, and nuclear deterrence have been much debated over the years. What if the ICJ were to take up the issue again after their 1996 Advisory Opinion? Would the result be any different, especially in light of the negotiation of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons? Please join us for a discussion of these issues.