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Differences between Russia and the United States in the Board of Governors at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) may inhibit multilateral verification of Iran’s safeguards obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
If some nuclear arsenals and operational plans are especially likely to threaten the global environment and food supply, all states would benefit from actions to reduce such risks.
Russia is replacing older nuclear technology with more modern, more functional options. What are the implications for the United States, Europe, and the future of arms control?
While China may not think it has an interest in participating in major-power arms control now, pressures are building for it to do so. If Washington wants to engage constructively with Beijing, it should focus on concrete proposals to manage competition.
NATO must prepare for the threats of tomorrow, when dynamics may be more complex than those between superpowers in the twentieth century. To plan for such a world will signal that the alliance is far from brain dead.
New START’s expiration will undermine U.S. security by removing all limits on Russia’s modernizing nuclear arsenal, by reducing our visibility into that arsenal. Extending New START will not create any new problems; the Treaty will continue to support U.S. national security goals
The future risks of inadvertent escalation due to entangled conventional and nuclear systems will depend on broader geopolitical developments, advances in non-nuclear weapons, changes in states’ military doctrines, and whether states can implement risk mitigation measures.
New evidence from the Yom Kippur War shows how growing entanglement between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons could lead to dangerous escalation spirals to nuclear war.
The next crisis between India and Pakistan might originate from an Indian offensive to seize territory in Kashmir. If so, the chances of the conflict escalating to war are more likely than currently predicted.
Policymakers are under the false impression that they are coming too late and that there is no time for regulating new dual-use technologies. But that impression is misleading.