Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Three decades of efforts to secure North Korea’s denuclearisation failed to arrest Pyongyang’s development of a nuclear arsenal.
Perhaps the more effective personnel are in reducing risk at the plant, the less nuclear safety will be threatened by combatants if diplomacy fails to achieve an accord not to attack the plant.
But for now, the United States should not lose site of the essential role that non-proliferation has and continues to have for U.S. interests in Asia and elsewhere. The answers to improved allied security on the Korean Peninsula are unlikely to be found with nuclear weapons.
For this roundtable, we invited four scholars, practitioners, and abolition advocates to further articulate what a research agenda on nuclear injustice should look like.
At this fraught moment, perhaps it was inevitable that Moscow would link New Start to Nato and Ukraine. However, until now, Washington and Moscow have been able to maintain work on issues that are in their mutual interest no matter how poor the state of the overall relationship.
Yoon Suk-yeol’s call to develop nuclear weapons is fundamentally a call for South Korea to know it can protect itself in a changing security environment.
Foreign Affairs Asks the Experts
New types of missiles, an adversarial NATO-Russia relationship, and the ever-present threat of inadvertent escalation make it necessary to start thinking anew how verifiable arms control with Russia may look like in the future.
To start off the new year, Tom Collina sits down with Ankit Panda, Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
A major goal of U.S. policy must therefore be to move Moscow away from nuclear saber-rattling and back to the more responsible role it has played since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis in controlling nuclear weapons and avoiding their proliferation.