States and experts preoccupied with winning (or at least not losing) wars that could go nuclear have largely ignored questions of post facto accountability.
Improvements in military technology have created new potential threats to nuclear forces and their command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) systems.
The UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will neither rid the world of nuclear weapons nor leave it more vulnerable to war, despite the hopes and fears of its staunchest proponents and opponents.
Nuclear risk reduction efforts in the Euro-Atlantic should begin with the Russian Federation and the United States ensuring they retain what is left of nuclear arms control and transparency.
As long as the order can be certified as coming from the president, and as long as military officials involved in implementing the decision do not object to the order as violating the law of armed conflict, U.S. forces are expected to carry out the order.
Personal recollections and insights of a participants in the Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security process in the 1990s for building a Middle East regional security architecture.
Asia’s two largest nuclear powers have never threatened each other with nuclear weapons. How much will the recent deadly border clashes between China and India change the security landscape?
The stage is set for a potentially disruptive period in South Korea–U.S. security relations. If tensions are allowed to build, the alliance could rupture.
The United States could withdraw the tactical weapons it deploys in Europe with no negative consequences for NATO unity and the security of Europe. In order to secure such an outcome, German leaders and NATO policymakers will have to combine reassurance and arms control in novel and smart ways.
There are three guiding principles that can help make future arms control dialogues more successful.