Van Jackson sits down with Ankit Panda to talk about writing productivity hacks, how to become a foreign policy pundit, and tips for straddling new media and the think tank world.
Revisions to the U.S.–South Korea missile guidelines open a new era in Seoul’s space ambitions, but their consequences for regional security are limited.
While both countries may think the situation is under control, dismissive attitudes and misperceptions could end up fueling a dangerous competition.
The U.S. detonated atomic boms over Japan 75 years ago. To this day, it remains the only use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict, but countries around the world have built their capacity to an estimated total of nearly 14,000 warheads over the last 70 years.
Seventy-five years ago, U.S. nuclear weapons devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For individual human beings, 75 years signals nearness to the end of life. But for the nuclear age, does this anniversary mark the beginning, the middle, or the end?
What model for nuclear disarmament might a nuclear-armed state demand of its adversaries and accept for itself? If states were to commit to dismantle their nuclear arsenals, what would be the key benchmarks for assessing the progressive implementation of such a commitment?
If China and the United States can dispel some misperceptions on their dispute over missile defense, it could help forestall a costly, ill-timed nuclear arms race.
As the debate about whether to extend the New START Treaty continues, the treaty’s verification provisions remain one its most powerful tools for ensuring Russia’s compliance with nuclear arms control.
The death of nuclear arms control seems imminent. But what about conventional arms?
An accomplished negotiator puts nuclear arms control in perspective—what it has achieved, where it has failed, and what it can do for our future security.