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Shares of Urenco, a pioneering developer of gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment, may soon change hands, but a sale of the company is unlikely to increase the risk of proliferation.
Decision- and policy-makers need a set of revised influence and deterrence tools and approaches that are applicable to the modern security environment.
The U.S. government should not require all foreign countries with which it concludes new nuclear cooperation agreements to legally commit themselves not to enrich uranium and reprocess spent fuel.
With the coming to power of the new administration in Iran, there is a renewed hope for nuclear negotiations.
There is still a window of opportunity for cooperation between the United States and Russia on conventional prompt global strike weapons.
Any Conventional Prompt Global Strike acquisition decision should be preceded by an in-depth and detailed debate about the costs, risks, and benefits of all potential CPGS alternatives. Their military utility is a natural starting point for such a debate.
Proposed revisions to the U.S. rules governing nuclear technology transfers do much to accommodate commercial interests without compromising national security.
Pakistani luminaries met with Chinese luminaries a few months ago, and their handshake will translate into a brand new 1,000-MW power reactor–Kanupp-2–being plunked down into the middle of Pakistan’s mega-metropolis Karachi.
Despite undergoing some delays, Iran’s construction of a new heavy water reactor to the northwest of the city of Arak could eventually match the proliferation risk posed by the country’s uranium enrichment program.
Washington should endorse the Russian proposal and invest President Vladimir Putin’s prestige in winning Syria’s assent and full, timely implementation. Such an outcome would be better than military action and better than no action.