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A nuclear weapon in the hands of Iran is by no means inevitable.
Washington and Seoul are working on a diplomatic response to accompany their resolve not to blink should Kim Jong-un launch an attack, and they also want to wrap up two years of negotiations on a new bilateral agreement for nuclear cooperation.
A recent proposal suggests that the P5+1 should offer to help Iran convert its inventory of UF6 into uranium metal and process it into fuel plates for the TRR reactor.
The covert history of Iran’s nuclear program is marked by enormous financial costs, unpredictable risks, and unclear motivations.
President Barack Obama should articulate a narrowed framework for the legitimate use of nuclear weapons that the United States believes would be defensible for others to follow as long as nuclear weapons remain.
Transparency Measures involve voluntary exchanges of sensitive information, possibly developing a standard reporting form, perhaps, eventually, with legal status, or new forms of access and engagement.
In China, nonproliferation continues to be framed as an excuse behind which Washington and its allies are able to engage in provocative and destabilizing acts.
For denizens of the southern half of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea's third nuclear test was so threatening that it has moved onto center stage a once-fringe debate about whether South Korea should acquire nuclear weapons of its own.
The acute tension on the Korean peninsula is threatening critical negotiations on peaceful nuclear cooperation between the United States and South Korea.
Negotiations with Iran, including the offer of incentives and the threat of further sanctions, are still the least-naive option available today.