The modest, verifiable reductions set out in New START do not raise hard questions about the adequacy of the U.S. deterrent. Instead, ratifying the treaty is integral to the Obama administration's overall security agenda and very much in the U.S. national interest.
It is unlikely that sanctions alone, regardless of their magnitude, will deter Iran's nuclear activities if Iran's principal aim is to become a "virtual" nuclear weapon state.
Sanctions alone are unlikely to persuade Iran to stop enriching uranium, but there are few alternative measures that would increase pressure and change the behavior of the Iranian regime.
South Korea's recent success in winning contracts for building civilian nuclear power reactors in the UAE is likely to inflate its expectations for renegotiating the terms of its bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States.
In light of the 2008 U.S.–India deal, which exempted India from the nuclear trade guidelines set by the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the NSG now faces a delicate balancing act in confronting the possibility of a China-Pakistan nuclear deal.
The ongoing IAEA investigations in Iran and Syria and Israel’s nuclear capability are among the top issues on the agenda for the June IAEA Board of Governors meeting.
China's prospective nuclear deal with Pakistan would breach international protocol about the trade of nuclear equipment and material, raising concerns about the risks of nuclear proliferation.
The 2010 NPT Review Conference achieved small but significant steps and should be considered a win for the United States.
Nuclear nonproliferation cannot be considered utopian since we know what can and should be done to achieve it. The harder question, however, is whether we can muster the political will to create the necessary geo-political and security conditions to achieve common nonproliferation goals.
The biggest threat to nonproliferation remains in the Middle East. An informal, strategic dialogue could help identify steps that can build confidence before an agreement for a nuclear-weapon-free zone is reached.