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The upcoming Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference is a chance for all states—not only the United States—to stabilize and strengthen the nonproliferation regime.
Insisting on the establishment a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East is unrealistic and creates counterproductive expectations. A Nuclear-Test-Free Zone, however, would be a step in the right direction.
The Obama administration’s new Nuclear Posture Review reduces the role and number of U.S. nuclear weapons, identifies nuclear terrorism as the principal threat to the United States, and works to maintain a stable strategic relationship with China.
Ultimately, the challenge of enforcement is more difficult and important than the process of verification for securing a world without nuclear weapons.
China is poised to export two power reactors to Pakistan, despite guidelines adopted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The transaction is about to happen at a time when China's increasingly ambitious nuclear energy program is becoming more autonomous.
Militarily, the antiquated tactical U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe serve little to no purpose to NATO. But they remain a valuable bargaining chip and a strong symbol of U.S. security assurance to its European allies and partners.
The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review offers a number of hints on how Washington might influence the future of NATO's nuclear policy.
Nuclear disarmament must become a shared responsibility by identifying the role that non-nuclear-weapon state allies of the United States can play. Specifically, these states should engage with the United States on doctrine and with the NPT Review Conference on deterrence.
The prospect of enforcing a ban on the possession or use of nuclear weapons would require addressing similar difficulties to those faced in abolishing nuclear weapons entirely.
Governments should commission their defense research institutions to assess whether and how multilateral nuclear disarmament could be managed in nuclear-armed states to reach lower numbers.