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Expectations of a nuclear energy renaissance are particularly high in the United States, but government programs to jump start new reactor construction will likely not be enough to spark more than a handful of reactors by 2015.
Iran's domestic political turmoil has seemingly caused it to back out of an agreement with the P5+1 to send its processed uranium out of the country. The United States and its allies must now redouble efforts to make sure that Iran does not try to make nuclear weapons
Consulting the G20, rather than the G8, on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons would be a novel and intriguing approach to strengthening the nonproliferation regime.
Deeper cuts in U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty are three highly visible and important steps toward global nuclear disarmament. But more far-reaching efforts are needed to facilitate the hard work of disarmament, which will undoubtedly take decades.
Egypt's role in preventing a nuclear arms race in the Middle East is especially urgent and the 2010 NPT Review Conference is the next best chance to advance its disarmament agenda.
The specter of nuclear proliferation must be understood as both a political issue and a technological one; the intent of would-be proliferators needs to be addressed together with the science.
The upcoming 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference is an opportunity to strengthen the struggling nonproliferation regime, but achieving even modest success will require the political cooperation of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states.
James Acton and co-authors present an overview of the role of fissile material control in nuclear disarmament. They review past efforts to securing disarmament and discuss the major challenges facing the elimination of nuclear weapons today.
Senator Jon Kyl relies on old and misleading arguments to claim that the resumption of nuclear testing is necessary, but there are no technical or military reasons to resume U.S. nuclear weapons testing. The Senate's reconsideration of the CTBT should be based on an honest and up-to-date analysis of the facts.
Iran's refusal to export its enriched uranium as part of a deal to assuage concerns that it is developing nuclear weapons could have serious consequences, including unifying the major powers to adopt harsher legal and economic measures.