• Op-Ed

    The Future of the NPT: Should It be Enhanced, Changed or Replaced?

    Brazil's refusal to implement the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA weakens the nonproliferation regime as a whole. Brazil should lead by example and sign and ratify the Protocol before the opening of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

    • Op-Ed

    Iran Brings Urgency to U.S.'s Need to Ratify Nuclear-Test Treaty

    Universal ratification of the CTBT will create another tool for impeding Iran's nuclear ambitions, but the United States must take the lead.

    • Op-Ed

    Why a Month Matters

    Iran's month-long delay in inspections of the Qom facility has important implications for the IAEA's ability to properly understand the nature of the previously undeclared enrichment site.

    • Q&A

    The CTBT’s Importance for U.S. National Security

    The treaty calling for a global ban on nuclear tests was rejected by the United States Senate ten years ago. Ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) now will provide greater leverage over states of concern and enhance international peace and security.

    • Policy Outlook

    Dealing with Iran: The Power of Legitimacy

    Rules are the key to maintaining necessary pressure on Iran and framing a mutually-acceptable, face-saving outcome. Iran must take steps to build and maintain international confidence that all its nuclear activities are peaceful, and that none have military dimensions.

    • Proliferation Analysis

    Establishing the Right Precedent in Supplying Fuel to Iran

    The reported agreement to refuel the Tehran research reactor by shipping Iranian-made low enriched uranium to other states for further enrichment and fuel fabrication could be a good precedent for meeting Iran's future and potentially larger nuclear fuel needs.

    • Op-Ed

    Untangling Iran's Nuclear Web

    The United States and Russia need a coordinated approach to Iranian nuclear ambitions, where sanctions and opportunities become incentives pushing and pulling Iran toward a solution beneficial for both global security and Iran’s national interest.

    • Op-Ed

    Geneva: The TRR and Enrichment Abroad

    In the P5+1 talks at Geneva, Iran agreed to have low enriched uranium from its Natanz site further enriched abroad and fabricated into fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor. Yet technical problems could derail this initiative.

    • Proliferation Analysis

    A Rational Response to the Iranian Missile Threat

    • Greg Thielmann
    • October 01, 2009

    Better protection of U.S. forces and allies against the Iranian missile threat is reason enough to welcome the shift in U.S. missile defense policy. Improving the prospects for future progress in reducing the threat from Russia is icing on the cake.

    • Proliferation Analysis

    The P5+1 and Iran's Nuclear Program

    Unity among the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany will be key during this week's nuclear talks with Iran in Geneva. But can the P5+1 convince Iran that this time the international community means business?

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